Travaux et recherches

Par Elena Mizrokhi
Auxiliaire de recherche pour la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur les conflits identitaires et le terrorisme et pour le Programme Paix et sécurité internationales
Cliquez ici pour télécharger la suite de la recherche.

Résumé :
In the aftermath of the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia a great deal of ink was spilled on the topic of the next likely victim of Russian neo-imperialism. One of the most often cited hot spots was Crimea ? a region in Ukraine heavily populated by Russians and Russian speakers. This article examines the question of so called Russian separatists in Crimea and whether or not these groups constitute a threat to Ukraine's sovereignty.  The piece begins with a brief description of the historiography of the Crimean peninsula, highlighting the strategic status this coveted region possessed for various imperial states. The overview of the region's history helps the reader better understand the ethnic makeup of Crimea that has and continues to play an important, if not a defining, role in its politics. The article goes on to contrast the current wave of ?separatism' in Crimea with the movement of the early 1990s. The argument is that the region's drive for sovereignty following the break-up of the Soviet Union was a result of manipulation of the general public's dissatisfaction with Kiev's policies by a pro-Russian party in on the peninsula. The rise of pro- Russian separatist groups in the new millennium, on the other hand, reflects a growing desire of Putin's Russia to maintain its influence in the ?near abroad' by  constraining Ukraine's rapprochement with the West, particularly NATO. The analysis of numerous pro-Russian political, youth and religious associations leads to the conclusion that these groups do not represent a viable political threat to Ukraine's sovereignty for there is no sizeable electorate to back them up ? their size and importance being greatly exaggerated by the Russian state media. While the author insists that the ?separatist' groups in Crimea are not a threat, the possibility that Russia will manipulate these groups in order to stage public protests of the closure of its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol or to Ukraine's accession to NATO is acknowledged and taken seriously.

Par Félix Kuntzsch
Auxiliaire de recherche au Programme Paix et sécurité internationales
Candidat au doctorat en science politique, Université Laval
Date de publication : Juillet 2008
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Résumé :
This working paper offers a theory-informed analyses of the socio-political entities and non-state actors that a key to understand Afghanistan's state- and nation-building process. Introducing theoretical perspectives on state- and nation-building I propose a brief review of past attempts to modernize the country and sketch the contemporary challenges. In the second part I discuss the socio-political entities and non-state actors that are at the core of today's debates on Afghanistan's prospects for state- and nation-building. In turn, I analyze the notions of nation, ethnicity, and tribe and their role in the social and political transformations the country underwent. I then turn to the two non-state actors which are perceived as the main obstacles to the state's consolidation, namely warlords and the Taliban. Arguing against the dichotomizing view that Afghanistan is pre-modern when compared to ?our? modernity, I show the modern character of these socio-political entities and non-state actors. However traditional and fragmented, Afghanistan's social and political structures are the products of failed attempts to modernize Afghanistan's society.

Par Oana Tranca
Auxiliaire de recherche au Programme Paix et sécurité internationales
Candidate au doctorat au département de science politique, Université Laval
Date de publication : Mai 2008
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Résumé :
L'intervention des tierces parties, en particulier celle des acteurs internationaux dont le mandat est de protéger l'ordre et la stabilité internationale, occupe une place de plus en plus centrale dans l'étude des conflits ethniques. La décision d'intervenir est le résultat d'un processus complexe qui mobilise plusieurs dynamiques internes et externes des organisations internationales et de leurs États membres. Une estimation préliminaire du succès ou de l'échec de l'intervention est souvent considérée comme un élément déterminant de ce processus. Selon cette logique, certains conflits ethniques, particulièrement ceux qui mettent l'intervenant devant le dilemme d'un risque accru de violence et la possibilité d'échec des modalités classiques de résolution, auraient moins de chances d'attirer une intervention des tierces parties. Dans ce contexte, est-ce que la non-intervention est une alternative viable face à un échec potentiel? L'objectif principal de cette brève recherche est de comparer l'évolution d'un conflit ethnique pour lequel l'intervention a échoué par rapport à un conflit où aucune intervention n'a eu lieu. Deux études de cas, les conflits ayant au centre les Arméniens de Nagorno-Karabakh et les Karens de Birmanie, essaient de répondre à cette question en analysant l'impact de l'intervention échouée dans le premier cas face à l'inaction des acteurs internationaux dans le deuxième cas. Les conclusions de cette démarche devraient permettre de contribuer aux programmes de recherches sur les décisions d'intervention des tierces parties et de leurs effets à long terme.